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1363 
Essay 
The Supreme Court and Its Shrinking 
Docket: The Ghost of William Howard Taft 
Kenneth W. Starr† 
William Howard Taft genially served as the tenth Chief 
Justice of the United States.1 His career was of breathtaking 
variety. Younger even than current Solicitor General Paul 
Clement, the buoyant Solicitor General Taft delivered “speech” 
after “speech” in the Supreme Court in the late nineteenth cen-
tury. Little did he suspect, one might safely surmise, that one 
day—after an intervening tour of duty as President of the 
United States—he would occupy the center chair itself and lis-
ten to his successors (many times removed) delivering their 
“speeches” to the Court in the old English style. In those hal-
cyon, or at least less hurried, days, lawyers were allowed abun-
dant time to present their case, educate the Justices, and per-
haps even persuade the Court by the force of oral advocacy.2 
Those were also the days when the Court was duty-bound 
to decide the lion’s share of the cases that came before it.3 The 
 
†  Dean, Pepperdine University School of Law. The author would like to 
thank Terence S. Dougherty, Audrey Maness, and Hannah Dyer for their as-
sistance. 
 1. Chief Justice Taft was appointed by President Warren G. Harding in 
1921, and he presided over the Court until 1930. DAVID H. BURTON, TAFT, 
HOLMES, AND THE 1920’S COURT: AN APPRAISAL 113–14 (1998). 
 2. See Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Calendar 
of the Justices: How the Supreme Court’s Timing Affects Its Decisionmaking, 
36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 183, 193 (2004). Prior to 1873, two counselors on each side 
were permitted to argue up to two hours individually. Id. In 1873, the Court 
amended its rules, allowing each side to argue for two hours total. Id. 
 3. Although the Judiciary Act of 1916 attempted to lighten the docket by 
making certain decisions of the state and circuit courts final, there was a “gen-
eral post-war increase in all judicial business” that “increased the volume of 
cases coming to the Supreme Court from sources uncontrolled by the 1916 leg-
islation.” FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SU-
PREME COURT: A STUDY IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 255–56 (1928). Un-
affected by the 1916 Act were cases from the district courts, cases from the 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, and perhaps more significantly, 
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Court’s “appellate” docket was a mainstay of High Court prac-
tice, sharply cabining the sweeping discretion that the Court 
came to enjoy in deciding what to decide. But Taft presciently 
saw into the future. Not only did he persuasively insist that the 
Court move out of the subterranean quarters in the Capitol and 
into the building that only symbolically bears his name, Taft 
persistently maintained that the Court should be vested with 
broad discretion as to what work it would do.4 
So it was that eighty years ago, the Court received a 
mighty boost in charting its own path in being able to decide 
what to decide. This was a Taftian triumph of a high order. 
With the passage of the Judiciary Act of 1925, the Supreme 
Court largely became the master of its domain.5 No longer sad-
dled with a caseload dominated by mandatory appeals, the 
Court was largely free to decide which cases it wanted to hear. 
To be sure, the Act did not entirely jettison appellate (manda-
tory) jurisdiction, but review increasingly became a matter en-
trusted to the Justices’ discretion. In the intervening eighty 
years, the Court’s workload has come to be almost wholly 
dominated by the certiorari docket, carrying with it Chief Jus-
tice Taft’s dream of (virtually) unfettered mastery over its sub-
stantive workload.6 
Taft’s vision, however, has been compromised. His essen-
tial message to Congress was “trust us.” That is, Congress was 
to trust the Supreme Court to exercise its discretion responsi-
bly and prudently in order to accomplish two broad objectives: 
(i) to resolve important questions of law and (ii) to maintain 
uniformity in federal law. These Taftian values are faithfully 
embodied in the provision with which Supreme Court practitio-
ners are intimately familiar: Supreme Court Rule 10.7 
 
cases from the Court of Claims for the District of Columbia, which adjudicated 
numerous contract disputes arising from the war. Id. at 256. 
 4. Id. at 259. 
 5. Judiciary Act of 1925, ch. 229, 43 Stat. 936. 
 6. See Cordray & Cordray, supra note 2, at 194–95; Kenneth W. Starr, 
Op-Ed, Rule of Law: Trivial Pursuits at the Supreme Court, WALL ST. J., Oct. 
6, 1993, at A17 (stating that modernly “the court enjoys virtually unfettered 
discretion to select its docket”). 
 7. Supreme Court Rule 10 states, 
Review on a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial 
discretion. A petition for a writ of certiorari will be granted only for 
compelling reasons. The following, although neither controlling nor 
fully measuring the Court’s discretion, indicate the character of the 
reasons the Court considers: 
(a) a United States court of appeals has entered a decision in con-
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The second prong of Taft’s promise, however, has fallen by 
the wayside. Since the retirement of the late Justice Byron 
White,8 the Supreme Court by and large does not even pretend 
to maintain the uniformity of federal law.9 Curiously enough, 
this infidelity to the Taftian vision has largely gone unnoticed, 
save for those sourpusses (such as yours truly) whose efforts to 
catch the High Court’s attention are typically rebuffed.10 Whin-
ing aside, something has been afoot through much of the life of 
the just-concluded Rehnquist Court. Facts are stubborn things, 
 
flict with the decision of another United States court of appeals 
on the same important matter; has decided an important federal 
question in a way that conflicts with a decision by a state court of 
last resort; or has so far departed from the accepted and usual 
course of judicial proceedings, or sanctioned such a departure by 
a lower court, as to call for an exercise of this Court’s supervisory 
power; 
(b) a state court of last resort has decided an important federal 
question in a way that conflicts with the decision of another state 
court of last resort or of a United States court of appeals; 
(c) a state court or a United States court of appeals has decided 
an important question of federal law that has not been, but 
should be, settled by this Court, or has decided an important fed-
eral question in a way that conflicts with relevant decisions of 
this Court.  
A petition for a writ of certiorari is rarely granted when the asserted 
error consists of erroneous factual findings or the misapplication of a 
properly stated rule of law. 
SUP. CT. R. 10. 
 8. Even the late Justice White failed to bring much-needed attention to 
the persisting circuit conflicts. In fact, Congress’s Commission on Structural 
Alternatives, chaired by retired Justice White, made no mention of the ongo-
ing conflicts in its 1998 report, instead suggesting that the answer to the bur-
geoning appellate docket was to divide the Ninth Circuit into three smaller 
appellate venues. This proposal, if effectuated, would actually increase the 
number of unresolved circuit disputes. Arthur D. Hellman, Never the Same 
River Twice: The Empirics and Epistemology of Intercircuit Conflicts, 63 U. 
PITT. L. REV. 81, 89 (2001). 
 9. Arthur D. Hellman, Precedent, Predictability, and Federal Appellate 
Structure, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 1029, 1031 (1999) (“Those who advocate struc-
tural reform believe that the system too often fails to speak with an ‘authorita-
tive legal voice.’ As a consequence, appellate outcomes are less predictable and 
more ‘quirky.’”); Arthur D. Hellman, The Supreme Court, the National Law, 
and the Selection of Cases for the Plenary Docket, 44 U. PITT. L. REV. 521, 522–
23 (1983) (stating that “respected judges, scholars, and practitioners have be-
gun to question whether nine mortal men and women, constrained by the 
structure and procedures of appellate adjudication, can do everything that is 
necessary to maintain clarity and uniformity in the national law”). 
 10. Starr, supra note 6. 
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as Mr. Adams famously argued before the Boston Massacre 
jury,11 and the facts show beyond the slightest doubt that the 
Court is willing to allow conflicts in federal law to exist—and, 
even worse, to persist. 
In this Essay, I discuss how the Rehnquist Court, due in 
large part to its shrinking merits docket, failed to live up to 
Chief Justice Taft’s vision. In Part I, I examine the prevailing 
theories that attempt to explain the Rehnquist Court’s deliber-
ate reduction of its caseload. Though this question of why is 
important, it is not one that I answer on these pages. Instead, I 
suggest that the reduced merits docket has exacerbated the 
shortcomings within the Rehnquist Court’s grant process of 
certiorari review, and has had a negative impact on its juris-
prudence. In Part II, I suggest that the “cert. pool”—the first 
level of review for any petition for certiorari—has become too 
powerful. In short, the law clerks that do the work of the cert. 
pool, recent law school graduates with little legal experience, 
exercise an unjustifiable influence over which cases the Su-
preme Court reviews. In Part III, I argue that the Court’s de-
creased caseload has ironically resulted in less clarity of law, as 
the Justices seemingly pursue their own particularistic agen-
das during the much more leisurely opinion-writing process. As 
a result, the Court is not simply saying what the law is, but in-
stead is using its relaxed merits docket to insert itself into con-
troversial arenas of social discourse. Finally, in Part IV, I argue 
that living up to Chief Justice Taft’s lofty goals is within the 
reach of the now-Roberts Court. In order to meet its Taftian du-
ties, the Roberts Court should work harder. It should decide 
more cases, and those cases should be of a less headline-
grabbing nature. 
I.  THEORIES ON THE REHNQUIST COURT’S  
REDUCED CASELOAD 
The great disappearing merits docket has arrested the sus-
tained attention of a handful of Court watchers: the University 
of Pittsburgh School of Law’s Arthur D. Hellman,12 Capital 
 
 11. John Adams, Rex v. Wemms, in 3 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 98, 
269 (L. Kinvin Wroth & Hiller B. Zobel eds., 1965); see also David McCullough, 
Champion of the Navy, NAVAL HISTORY, Oct. 2001, at 40. 
 12. See Arthur D. Hellman, Case Selection in the Burger Court: A Pre-
liminary Inquiry, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 947 (1985); Arthur D. Hellman, 
Conference on Empirical Research in Judicial Administration—Foreword: Ex-
ploring the Mysteries of the Least Known Branch, 21 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 33 (1989); 
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Law School’s Margaret Meriwether Cordray and her husband 
Richard Cordray,13 and the University of Virginia’s David M. 
O’Brien.14 Professor Hellman’s empirical analysis of the Court 
from 1983 to 1995 suggests that the traditional explanations 
for the Court’s shrinking docket do not actually explain the 
phenomenon.15 Instead, the shrinkage is the result of a new 
“Olympian” Court—one that issues fewer, more monumental 
opinions.16 The Cordrays take a contrary view. In their opinion, 
the Rehnquist Court’s shrinking docket has been the result of 
several factors—most importantly that the Court’s newest 
members have been less inclined to grant review than their 
predecessors, and that the federal government’s success in the 
lower courts has resulted in fewer petitions for certiorari.17 Pro-
fessor O’Brien examines the inner workings of the Court’s 
grant process, including the role of the cert. pool. Like the 
Cordrays, Professor O’Brien suggests that the Rehnquist 
Court’s shrinking docket was influenced by newer Justices 
more hesitant to grant review—specifically that the Justices 
were more likely to follow the “Rule of Four” instead of casting 
“Join-3” votes.18 Additionally, Professor O’Brien is uncertain 
 
Arthur D. Hellman, Error Correction, Lawmaking, and the Supreme Court’s 
Exercise of Discretionary Review, 44 U. PITT. L. REV. 795 (1983) [hereinafter 
Hellman, Error Correction]; Arthur D. Hellman, The Business of the Supreme 
Court Under the Judiciary Act of 1925: The Plenary Docket in the 1970’s, 91 
HARV. L. REV. 1711 (1978) [hereinafter Hellman, The Business of the Supreme 
Court]; Arthur D. Hellman, The Shrunken Docket of the Rehnquist Court, 1996 
SUP. CT. REV. 403 (1996) [hereinafter Hellman, The Shrunken Docket]. 
 13. See Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Supreme 
Court’s Plenary Docket, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 737 (2001). 
 14. See David M. O’Brien, Join-3 Votes, the Rule of Four, the Cert. Pool, 
and the Supreme Court’s Shrinking Plenary Docket, 13 J.L. & POL. 779 (1997). 
 15. Hellman, The Shrunken Docket, supra note 12, at 409–29. Professor 
Hellman proposes, then ultimately rejects, the repeal of the Court’s mandatory 
jurisdiction, retirement of liberal Justices, homogeneity within the lower 
courts, the reduced number of cases brought by the federal government, and 
the conservative nature of the lower courts as reasons why the Supreme Court 
has been deciding fewer cases. 
 16. Id. at 432–38. 
 17. Cordray & Cordray, supra note 13, at 793–94 (noting that “[c]hanges 
in the Court’s personnel . . . have played a substantial role in shrinking the 
docket,” and that another “important influence that has independently con-
tributed to the decline is the changing pattern of federal civil litigation involv-
ing government parties”). 
 18. O’Brien, supra note 14, at 798–99 (“In sum, the inflation and contrac-
tion in the plenary docket basically registered changes in the Court’s composi-
tion and case selection process . . . .”). Under the “Rule of Four,” a petition for 
certiorari will not be granted unless at least four of the nine Justices agree to 
hear the case. A “Join-3” vote occurs when one Justice agrees to vote for a 
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whether the cert. pool has a significant impact on the robust-
ness of the Court’s merits docket.19 
What these scholars are seeking to understand is why the 
Supreme Court’s docket has shrunk from 146 signed opinions 
during Chief Justice Rehnquist’s first year occupying the 
Court’s center seat to just 74 signed opinions during his final 
year.20 While no single answer explains the Rehnquist Court’s 
docket-shrinking behavior, the continual (and consistent) re-
duction of its caseload has been well documented. 
A. MEASURING THE SUPREME COURT’S CASELOAD OVER TIME 
Since at least 1878, scholars and Court watchers have 
cataloged the number of cases on the Court’s docket.21 The most 
comprehensive study, The Supreme Court Compendium, decon-
structs the High Court’s docket based on the total number of 
cases filed each year, the types of cases filed, and the Justices’ 
voting patterns.22 Set forth below is a simple comparison of the 
total number of cases on the Court’s docket with the number of 
cases the Court actually decides. Different methods of deter-
mining the Supreme Court’s workload exist, but the “number of 
cases disposed of by signed opinion” represents a standard 
measure.23 Based on these numbers, one thing is clear: the 
number of cases coming before the Supreme Court grew stead-
ily since 1925, while the number of cases the Court decides has 
been in steady decline. 
 
grant only if three other Justices vote to grant certiorari—otherwise that Jus-
tice will vote against the grant. Id. at 784. 
 19. Id. at 802 (stating that “it is unclear that the cert. pool either deter-
mines the amount of scrutiny given petitions or was the underlying factor in 
the increasing and subsequent decreasing in the size of the plenary docket”). 
 20. LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA DECI-
SIONS & DEVELOPMENTS 7 tbl.2-8 (3d ed. 2003); JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR., 2005 
YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 7 (2006). See generally Hell-
man, The Shrunken Docket, supra note 12, at 404–05 (attempting to “explain 
why the Court is accepting only half as many cases for review as it did a dec-
ade ago”). 
 21. FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 3, at 296. 
 22. EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 20. 
 23. In terms of raw numbers, the Supreme Court’s workload can also be 
determined by examining the number of petitions for certiorari that are 
granted, the total number of cases disposed of, the total number of cases dis-
posed of on the merits, or the total number of opinions that the Court writes. 
See Paul E. Parker, Is a Lower Caseload the Same as a Lower Workload?: 
Opinion Characteristics of the Burger and Rehnquist Courts, 20 JUST. SYS. J. 
299, 299–302 (1999). 
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The Supreme Court and Its Docket: 1926–200424 
Term Total Number of 
Cases on the 
Docket25 
Number of Cases 
Disposed of by 
Signed Opinion26 
Percent of Cases  
Disposed of by 
Signed Opinion27 
1926 1,183 223 18.9 % 
1930 1,304 235 18.0 % 
1935 1,092 187 17.1 % 
1940 1,109 195 17.6 % 
1945 1,460 170 11.6 % 
1950 1,321 114 8.6 % 
1955 1,849 103 5.6 % 
1960 2,296 125 5.4 % 
1965 3,256 120 3.7 % 
1970 4,212 137 3.3 % 
1975 4,761 160 3.4 % 
1980 5,144 144 2.8 % 
1985 5,158 161 3.1 % 
1990 6,316 121 1.9 % 
1995 7,565 87 1.2 % 
2000 8,965 83 0.9 % 
2004 8,593 85 1.0 % 
B. ANALYZING THE DATA ON THE SUPREME COURT’S CASELOAD 
In their respective analyses, Professor Hellman, the 
Cordrays, and Professor O’Brien have advanced various rea-
sons for the Court’s shrinking “merits docket” (as represented 
by the number of cases disposed of by signed opinion). The first 
is structural, namely that in 1988 Congress “eliminated virtu-
ally all of the remaining elements of the mandatory jurisdic-
tion” left in the wake of the Judges’ Bill of 1925.28 Despite the 
 
 24. These statistics were compiled from EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 220, 
at 58–63 tbl.2-2, 64–65 tbl.2-3; ROBERTS, supra note 20, at 7; The Supreme 
Court, 2004 Term—The Statistics, 119 HARV. L. REV. 415, 425 tbl.II (2005). 
 25. This number exceeds the number of new cases filed each year because 
the Court holds over a certain number of cases from one term to the next. 
 26. This number exceeds the total number of signed opinions issued by 
the Court because some opinions may dispose of more than one case. 
 27. These numbers have been rounded to the nearest tenth of a percent. 
 28. Hellman, The Shrunken Docket, supra note 12, at 409. In 1988, Con-
gress eliminated the mandatory appeals from state supreme courts, as well as 
appeals from any courts that invalidate state statutes. Act of June 27, 1988, 
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increased discretion the Court exercised over its own jurisdic-
tion after Congress passed the Judicial Improvements and Ac-
cess to Justice Act of 1988,29 the sharp decline in the number of 
cases on the Court’s merits docket came as a surprise to many 
Court watchers.30 After examining the data, Professor Hellman 
concludes that “the elimination of the mandatory jurisdiction 
played no more than a minuscule role in the shrinkage of the 
plenary docket.”31 The Cordrays agree, calling the 1988 act “ul-
timately unpersuasive” as a justification for the Court’s lighter 
caseload.32 One reason why the 1988 measure had such a minor 
impact is that the Justices had long (and sensibly) employed ef-
ficiency devices, such as summary affirmances and dismiss-
als.33 Another reason, suggested by the Cordrays, is that “in the 
mid-1980s the Court was not giving plenary consideration to 
appeals that did not warrant certiorari review” because the 
Court’s internal procedures already limited the number of cases 
the Justices considered.34 
The second explanation focuses on the Court’s post-1986 
membership. Specifically, Professor Hellman examines whether 
the retirement of the “three stalwarts of the liberal wing of the 
Burger Court—Justices William J. Brennan, Thurgood Mar-
shall, and Harry A. Blackmun” had the effect of shrinking the 
 
Pub. L. No. 100-352, 102 Stat. 662, (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1252, 
1254, 1257, 1258 (2000)); see also Cordray & Cordray, supra note 13, at 751–
52. 
 29. Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4642 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 5, 9, 16, 17, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.). 
 30. See Cordray & Cordray, supra note 13, at 743 (calling the sudden de-
cline of Supreme Court decisions after 1988 an “unexpected development that 
surprised and puzzled both participants and observers”). 
 31. Hellman, The Shrunken Docket, supra note 12, at 412. Commenting at 
the House appropriations hearings in 1996, Justice Anthony Kennedy stated, 
We had mandatory jurisdiction over cases that were unimportant. We 
calculated that there were 35 to 40 of these a year. We told the Con-
gress, please take those cases away from us, and the Congress did. 
And in part what you see after 1988 is a drop which we projected. 
Id. at 409. Despite Justice Kennedy’s comments, Professor Hellman suggests 
that the changes in the Court’s docket were not a result of the 1988 statute. 
Id. at 432–38. 
 32. Cordray & Cordray, supra note 13, at 751. The Cordrays’ final conclu-
sion is even stronger—they argue that “[t]he 1988 legislative changes thus 
seem to have had little or no effect on the Court’s plenary docket.” Id. at 758. 
 33. Hellman, Error Correction, supra note 12, at 812–20 (discussing how 
the Supreme Court could dispose of cases from state courts by dismissing 
them “for want of a substantial federal question”). 
 34. Cordray & Cordray, supra note 13, at 758. 
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merits docket.35 The common understanding was that the Bur-
ger Court’s “liberal” members were more likely to vote to hear 
cases involving “new issues.”36 According to Professor Hellman, 
that common understanding is flawed. His comparison of the 
cases heard prior to 1988 to those heard after 1988 suggests 
that the “liberal” wing did not exercise a unique influence over 
the choice of cases heard.37 
Professor O’Brien and the Cordrays disagree with Profes-
sor Hellman’s conclusion. Examining the grant process for the 
Burger and Rehnquist Courts, Professor O’Brien discerns that 
the Justices of the Rehnquist Court—specifically Justices Ken-
nedy, Scalia, and Stevens—have been less likely to vote to 
grant certiorari than their predecessors.38 Professor O’Brien’s 
analysis is based on the propensity of the Justices to cast “Join-
3” votes, as opposed to following the “Rule of Four.”39 Based on 
his analysis of internal Court documents,40 Professor O’Brien 
finds that the departure of the “liberal” Justices resulted in 
fewer “Join-3” votes, which in turn contributed to the 
Rehnquist Court’s reduced caseload.41 The Cordrays consider 
the changes in the Court’s personnel “[o]ne of the most compel-
ling explanations for the recent decline in the Supreme Court’s 
plenary docket.”42 By examining the conference votes of the in-
dividual Justices, the Cordrays argue, one can determine how a 
particular Justice’s “individual judgments about cases actually 
translate into expansion or contraction of their plenary 
docket.”43 Like Professor O’Brien, the Cordrays conclude that 
 
 35. Hellman, The Shrunken Docket, supra note 12, at 412. 
 36. Id. In addition, Professor Hellman examined whether, after the “lib-
eral” Justices retired, the Court heard fewer cases where the “lower courts had 
upheld convictions or rejected civil rights claims.” Id. at 405. 
 37. Id. at 413. 
 38. O’Brien, supra note 14, at 796 tbl.1. 
 39. Id. at 784–89. Under the “Rule of Four,” a petition for certiorari will 
not be granted unless at least four of the nine Justices agree to hear the case. 
A “Join-3” vote occurs when one Justice agrees to vote for a grant only if three 
other Justices vote to grant certiorari—otherwise that Justice will vote against 
the grant. Id. at 784. 
 40. Professor O’Brien relies on Docket Books, which are stored at the Li-
brary of Congress, the personal papers of various Justices, and correspondence 
between the Justices and himself. See, e.g., O’Brien, supra note 14, passim. 
 41. Id. at 798–99 (stating that the size of the Supreme Court’s docket is a 
reflection of “the Court’s composition and case selection process, specifically 
the predisposition of certain justices to cast Join-3 votes and to grant review”). 
 42. Cordray & Cordray, supra note 13, at 776. 
 43. Id. at 781. 
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the substitutions of Justice Scalia for Chief Justice Burger and 
Justice Kennedy for Justice Powell, coupled with the ascension 
of Justice Rehnquist to the Court’s center chair, “played a dis-
cernable part in shrinking the docket.”44 
A third hypothesis relates to Chief Justice Taft’s vision for 
the Supreme Court’s uniformity-enforcing function. The theory 
is this: due in large part to the sheer number of Reagan-Bush 
appointees, greater homogeneity prevails and less conflict 
abounds among the various courts of appeals.45 At the same 
time, the purportedly “conservative” lower courts are not pro-
ducing decisions that draw the (more conservative) High 
Court’s ire.46 Justice Souter subscribes to this theory. He notes 
that homogeneity within the lower courts has resulted in “a 
diminished level of philosophical division . . . from which so 
much of the conflicting opinions tend to arise.”47 Based upon 
their respective studies, however, the Cordrays and Professor 
Hellman flatly disagree.48 Professor Hellman admits that his 
study does not fully contemplate the total number of existing 
circuit conflicts, nor does it determine what percent of those 
conflicts are heard each year.49 However, the Cordrays note 
that “there are approximately 400” circuit splits each year, 
which suggests that there is no shortage of circuit conflicts for 
the Supreme Court to resolve.50 Even if the lower courts have 
 
 44. Id. at 784–85. 
 45. Hellman, The Shrunken Docket, supra note 12, at 414 (quoting Justice 
David H. Souter who suggests that during the Reagan and Bush administra-
tions there was a “greater degree of [philosophical] homogeneity in the courts” 
that resulted in “fewer conflicts in the courts of appeals” (alteration in origi-
nal)). 
 46. Id. at 419 (“[T]he Supreme Court . . . is viewed as having shifted to 
‘the right.’ Some commentators believe that this convergence goes far toward 
explaining the shrinkage of the plenary docket in the 1990’s.”). 
 47. O’Brien, supra note 14, at 781 (quoting Shannon Duffy, Inside the 
Highest Court; Souter Describes Justices’ Relationship, Caseload Trend, PA. L. 
WKLY., Apr. 17, 1995, at 10). 
 48. Compare Cordray & Cordray, supra note 13, at 774–76, with Hellman, 
The Shrunken Docket, supra note 12, at 416. Professor Hellman’s data 
“squarely contradict” Justice Souter’s own observations about the Court. For 
example, in cases involving statutory questions, the Court’s “conflict” docket 
actually increased from 1983–1985 to 1993–1995. Hellman, The Shrunken 
Docket, supra note 12, at 416. 
 49. Hellman, The Shrunken Docket, supra note 12, at 416 (noting that his 
data “do not tell us whether intercircuit conflicts became more or less numer-
ous . . . [n]or do they enable us to draw any conclusions about homogeneity (or 
lack of it) in the courts of appeals”). 
 50. Cordray & Cordray, supra note 13, at 772 (citing to the Circuit Split 
Roundup that is regularly printed in United States Law Week, “a publication 
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become more “conservative,”51 Professor Hellman concludes 
that the changed profile has little effect on the Supreme Court’s 
merits docket.52 
The final suggested reason is that the number of cases be-
ing brought by the United States has been decreasing.53 As the 
most frequent litigator in the Supreme Court (usually as a re-
spondent), the Solicitor General’s petitions enjoy a 60 percent 
grant rate.54 By comparison, the Supreme Court grants review 
in less than 2 percent of its total docket each year.55 Since 1988, 
Professor Hellman notes that there has been a substantial de-
crease in the number of petitions filed by the Solicitor General’s 
office.56 He suggests that this decrease is, in turn, at least par-
tially responsible for the decrease in size of the Court’s 
docket.57 The Cordrays take this analysis a step further to de-
 
that describes those decisional conflicts which can be identified by examining 
the face of individual lower court opinions”). 
 51. Hellman, The Shrunken Docket, supra note 12, at 420. Professor 
Hellman notes that his study of the types of cases the Supreme Court heard in 
the past two decades does “not refute the ‘conservative judges’ thesis, but [his 
data] do suggest caution in embracing it.” Id. 
 52. Id. at 423–24 (stating that the “data strongly suggest that the expla-
nation for the shrunken docket of the 1990’s does not lie in the supposedly 
conservative predilections of the Reagan-Bush appointees to the federal courts 
of appeals”). 
 53. Cordray & Cordray, supra note 13, at 764 (citing to statistics from the 
Solicitor General’s office that demonstrate “that the United States has been 
seeking plenary review in fewer cases in recent years”). 
 54. Hellman, The Shrunken Docket, supra note 12, at 417. 
 55. In the Court’s 2003 term, there were 7,814 case filings. Of those cases, 
91 were argued and 89 were disposed of in 73 signed opinions. In the Court’s 
2004 term, there were 7,496 case filings. Of those cases, 87 were argued and 
85 were disposed of in 74 signed opinions. For that two-year period, the last 
two years in which Chief Justice Rehnquist occupied the Supreme Court’s cen-
ter chair, less than 1 percent of the Supreme Court’s case filings were disposed 
of by signed opinions. See JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR., 2005 YEAR-END REPORT ON 
THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 7 (2006). 
 56. Professor Hellman notes that in 
the 1983–85 Terms, the plenary docket included 123 cases in which 
the certiorari petition or jurisdictional statement was filed by the 
Federal Government. A decade later, Federal Government cases 
numbered only 46. That represents a shrinkage of nearly two-thirds. 
And it accounts for nearly 40% of the overall reduction in the level of 
plenary activity. 
Hellman, The Shrunken Docket, supra note 12, at 417. 
 57. Id. at 418 (finding that the “reduction in the number of petitions filed 
by the Solicitor General does account for a substantial part of the shrinkage of 
the plenary docket in the 1990s”). The Cordrays also believe that the decrease 
in the number of cases brought by the Federal Government could account for 
“as much as half of the overall reduction in the plenary docket.” Cordray & 
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termine why the Solicitor General is not filing as many cases.58 
They conclude that a combination of factors—that the Solicitor 
General’s office is simply bringing fewer cases, and that it is 
winning more of the cases that it does bring—is responsible for 
the declining role of the United States as a litigant.59 
After rejecting the most common explanations for the Su-
preme Court’s shrinking docket, Professor Hellman offers one 
final suggestion—that the Justices of the Rehnquist Court 
shared a fundamentally different judicial philosophy than their 
predecessors as to the administration of justice in the federal 
system. Quite simply, the Justices of the Rehnquist Court often 
seemed more content to stay their hands.60 Despite the 
Rehnquist Court’s reduced docket, Professor Hellman believes 
that the Rehnquist Court lived up to Chief Justice Taft’s vi-
sion—that its “function is not to correct errors in the lower 
courts, but to ‘secure harmony of decision and the appropriate 
settlement of questions of general importance.’”61 Professor 
Hellman argues that the Rehnquist Court lived up to Taft’s vi-
sion though a series of “Olympian” decisions.62 Rather than 
“engag[ing] in the process of developing the law through a suc-
cession of cases in the common-law tradition . . . Court deci-
sions tend to be singular events, largely unconnected to other 
cases on the docket and even more detached from the work of 
lower courts.”63 Because the Court has resorted to boldly 
“Olympian” efforts, Professor Hellman is concerned that every 
decision will necessarily promote a substantial advance of legal  
 
 
Cordray, supra note 13, at 794. 
 58. Cordray & Cordray, supra note 13, at 765–71. 
 59. Id. at 794. 
 60. Hellman, The Shrunken Docket, supra note 12, at 429–32. For exam-
ple, Chief Justice Warren E. Burger was known for supporting “Supreme 
Court review of activist decisions by lower courts.” Id. at 429. Justice Byron R. 
White “took an expansive view of the Court’s role in providing doctrinal guid-
ance to the lower courts.” Id. By contrast, the current Justices 
take a substantially different view of the Court’s role in the American 
legal system than the Justices of the 1980s. They are less concerned 
about rectifying isolated errors in the lower courts . . . and they be-
lieve that a relatively small number of nationally binding precedents 
is sufficient to provide doctrinal guidance for the resolution of recur-
ring issues. 
Id. at 430–31. 
 61. Id. at 432 (quoting Hellman, The Business of the Supreme Court, su-
pra note 12, at 1718). 
 62. Id. at 433. 
 63. Id. 
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principles, and that the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence will 
leave too many “gaps” in important areas of federal law.64 
The empirical analyses thoughtfully undertaken by the 
Cordrays, Professor Hellman, and Professor O’Brien are use-
fully illuminating. My own, more anecdotal observations sug-
gest two different questions worthy of examination. The first is 
that, given the reduced number of cases, the process by which 
the Court decides what to decide has become increasingly im-
portant. That decision-making process is deeply informed by 
the cert. pool. Instead of exercising independent judgment, 
eight chambers pool their law clerk resources so that a single 
law clerk “reports” to eight of the nine Justices.65 This is an odd 
way to conduct vitally important business. This efficiency-
driven device has been inadequately studied, but what is com-
monly understood is that the prevailing culture within the pool 
is to “just say no.”66 The other question relates to how the Jus-
tices are adjudicating cases they actually hear. While the War-
ren Court was roundly criticized for its less-than-thorough 
analysis of constitutional issues,67 the Rehnquist Court has, in 
 
 64. Id. at 433–34 (stating that the “paucity” of Supreme Court “decisions 
will leave wide gaps in the doctrines governing important areas of law”). 
 65. O’Brien, supra note 14, at 799. Chief Justice Roberts has agreed to 
join the cert. pool for his first year, suggesting he may reevaluate that choice 
after he settles into his new role. Tony Mauro, Roberts Dips His Toe into Cert 
Pool, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Oct. 24, 2005, at 7. When questioned about the 
cert. pool during his confirmation hearing, Justice Alito stated: 
If I’m fortunate enough to be confirmed, I think I would assess the 
situation at that time and talk to the Supreme Court justices and see 
what their views are, the reasons why they’re proceeding in one way 
or another . . . . We cannot delegate our judicial responsibility. But we 
do need to call on—we need to find ways, and we do find ways, of ob-
taining assistance from clerks and staff, employees so that we can 
deal with the large case load that we have. 
U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee Holds a Hearing on Judge Samuel Alito’s 
Nomination to the Supreme Court, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/alitoday2.php 
(Jan. 10, 2006) (statement of Judge Samuel Alito). 
 66. H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE 
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 218 (1991). One clerk stated, “We saw our 
role as clerks to find every reason possible to deny cert. petitions.” Id. Another 
commented, “There is enormous pressure not to take a case . . . there is an in-
stitutionalized inertia not to grant cert.” Id. These testimonies are clarified by 
the statement of another, “You have to screen down to [so few] argument days, 
so there is a strong presumption for not hearing cases . . . . Today the backdrop 
is: ‘is this one of the 160 most pressing cases of the year? Show me.’” Id. at 
219. 
 67. Id. at 147–48. While it is hard to say that the statement was represen-
tative of any other Justice, Perry quotes an anonymous Justice who lays out 
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its leisure, become a virtual sounding board for varying inter-
pretive methodologies. Burdened with less work, the Rehnquist 
Court has been marked, not by growing consensus, but by an 
unhelpful, frustrating cacophony of jurisprudential voices. 
II.  THE UNJUSTIFIABLE INFLUENCE OF  
THE CERT. POOL 
The role of law clerks is a hearty perennial of an issue. The 
relevant concern for today’s discussion, however, is quite lim-
ited—namely that the cert. pool is, in my view, unhealthily 
powerful. Over ten years ago I had the effrontery to craft a 
double-header Op-Ed piece in the Wall Street Journal.68 In 
those pieces, I lamented the Rehnquist Court’s tendency to al-
low circuit conflicts to fester.69 I suggested that the law in gen-
eral and the business community in particular suffered from 
the instability and uncertainty infecting various bodies of fed-
eral law.70 I further suggested that one reason for the Justices’ 
implicit acceptance of this unhappy state of affairs was the ex-
panding role of the growing cadre of law clerks.71 
Those clerks serve as mighty “barriers to entry” to the mer-
its docket. The prevailing spirit among the twenty-five-year old 
legal savants, whose life experience is necessarily limited in 
scope, is to seek out and destroy undeserving petitions.72 The 
prevailing ethos is that no harm can flow from “just saying 
no.”73 Self-confident law clerks can rest assured that few, if 
any, recriminations will attend their providing guidance to the 
Court to deny certiorari.74 Harm can, and indeed does, flow 
 
the criticism quite plainly: 
Chief Justice Warren was credited a lot for having a unanimous 
Court in Brown. The cost was having “all deliberate speed” come in. I 
think it would have been better to have the dissent spelled out . . . 
have the dissenters tell their problems, and then have a strong opin-
ion to answer the dissent rather than coming down with a weak opin-
ion so that everyone would sign. I think it is better to acknowledge 
what argument there is on a controversial issue like that. 
Id. at 148. 
 68. Starr, supra note 6; Kenneth W. Starr, Op-Ed, Rule of Law: Supreme 
Court Needs a Management Revolt, WALL ST. J., Oct. 13, 1993, at A23 [herein-
after Starr, Revolt]. 
 69. Starr, Revolt, supra note 68. 
 70. Starr, supra note 6; Starr, Revolt, supra note 68. 
 71. Starr, supra note 6; Starr, Revolt, supra note 68. 
 72. See PERRY, supra note 66, at 218–20. 
 73. See id. 
 74. One clerk remarked, “You see, it really didn’t matter if the Court 
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when a hapless clerk recommends a grant of certiorari, and the 
merits are eventually seen as not all they were cracked up to 
be.75 In short, cert. pool malpractice of sorts attends the woebe-
gone clerk whose recommended grant results in a “DIG” (dis-
missal of a case because certiorari was improvidently 
granted).76 This, in turn, creates a hydraulic pressure to say no. 
Along the way, by happy coincidence, the Justices have less 
work to do and more time to articulate and elaborate upon their 
pet theories and resolve their “Olympian” cases. 
The cert. pool began modestly enough upon the suggestion 
of the efficiency-minded Justice Louis F. Powell, Jr.77 Launched 
in the early 1970s, the pool comfortably boasted a membership 
of five Justices, including the Chief.78 But now the pool has 
dominant market power. Of the presently sitting Justices, John 
Paul Stevens is the lone absentee.79 
As a practical matter, the cert. pool does promote judicial 
efficiency. However, that efficiency is achieved at the expense 
of informed judgment. For example, Justice Stevens admits to 
relying entirely on his clerks’ memoranda and “not even 
look[ing] at the papers in over 80 percent of the cases that are 
filed.”80 Justice Scalia relies on the cert. pool to an even greater 
extent—he only reads cert. pool memos in cases where three 
Justices had voted for a grant.81 In true Washington, D.C., 
fashion, this modest government program has grown signifi-
cantly and now possesses great power. This market power has 
been magnified by the much-studied fact that the Supreme 
Court is hearing fewer cases each year. The Justices are doing 
less and are shifting their focus to resolving “Olympian” dis-
putes. 
 
made a mistake in not taking a case. It is better to let it have a little extra 
time, because if we didn’t grant cert., the case will come up again . . . the issue 
will be back up again, so it doesn’t matter if it is not taken.” Id. at 221. 
 75. Pool memos are the primary vehicle for the grant or denial of certio-
rari in most cases. Id. at 70–71. Some Justices have used them as their only 
tool to make the decision. Id. 
 76. Richard L. Revesz & Pamela S. Karlan, Nonmajority Rules and the 
Supreme Court, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1067, 1082 (1988). 
 77. O’Brien, supra note 14, at 790. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 799. 
 80. Id. at 801 (citing DAVID M. O’BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME 
COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS 164 (4th ed. 1996)). 
 81. Id. at 801 (citing Memorandum for Conference (September 24, 1986) 
(on file with the Thurgood Marshall Papers, Box 379, in the Manuscripts room 
of the Library of Congress)). 
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III.  THE SUPREME COURT’S DECREASED CASELOAD 
AND LESS CLARITY OF LAW 
To be sure, the significantly reduced caseload permits the 
Court to devote careful attention to the cases that comprise its 
scaled-down merits docket. But one wonders whether this extra 
capacity has yielded helpful dividends concerning the clarity of 
federal law. Indeed, the Justices seem skeptical of values such 
as stability and predictability. Their control—and shrinking—
of the merits docket suggests as much. 
This deep ambivalence toward the efficacy of legal doctrine 
stands out as an enduring quality of the Rehnquist Court’s ten-
ure of almost two decades. The upshot is lack of predictability. 
Time and again, and particularly when the practical stakes are 
high, the Rehnquist Court chose the course of practical wisdom, 
the Justices following their collective lights instead of engaging 
in orthodox constitutional analysis.82 That is to say, the re-
duced dialect has created judicial “space” for weaving culture-
shaping opinions. Instead of an exacting analysis of text, struc-
ture, history, and even its own precedent, the Court was fre-
quently guided by a different polestar—that of mirroring broad 
cultural and social trends in fashioning what the Rehnquist 
Court Justices deemed a sensible, practical rule for governing 
the people.83 Instead of driving the culture, as did the Warren 
Court, the Rehnquist Court more narrowly demanded the last 
word on issues that divide the nation.84 The Rehnquist Court 
 
 82. As an example, Judge Douglas Ginsburg calls Atkins v. Virginia, 536 
U.S. 304 (2002), “as frankly a legislative decision as the Court has ever ren-
dered. It has nothing to do with the constitutionality of capital punishment 
and everything to do with the Justices’ personal senses of decency.” Honorable 
Douglas H. Ginsburg, On Constitutionalism, 2003 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 7, 19 
(2003). He explains that his disagreement is not with the Court’s chosen pol-
icy, “but with the Court’s making such choices for us, notwithstanding the lack 
of any sound basis in the Constitution for doing so.” Id. 
 83. In Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000), the Chief Jus-
tice, writing for the Court, explained that there was no justification for over-
ruling Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), partially because the now fa-
miliar warnings had “become part of our national culture.” Dickerson, 560 U.S. 
at 443. Hence, there was no “special justification” for departing from precedent 
and stare decisis. Dickerson, 560 U.S. at 443. 
 84. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 866–
67 (1992) (plurality opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.) (“Where, 
in the performance of its judicial duties, the Court decides a case in such a 
way as to resolve the sort of intensely divisive controversy reflected in Roe and 
those rare, comparable cases, its decision has a dimension that the resolution 
of the normal case does not carry. It is the dimension present whenever the 
Court’s interpretation of the Constitution calls the contending sides of a na-
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says, in effect, “we’re in charge.” As it pronounced the final 
word, the Rehnquist Court’s judgments sought to reflect emerg-
ing social and cultural trends.85 Whereas the Warren Court 
was reshaping society’s institutions, the Rehnquist Court 
served more modestly as a national weathervane. It measured 
and reflected, but did not drive and shape. It was, in short, the 
Court carrying out the broad political function envisioned by 
Madison in Federalist 1086—a Court determined to eradicate 
pockets of perceived oppression, of arbitrariness, of caprice, re-
sulting from the capture of control by a powerful “faction.”87 
The nation’s highest Court embraced the governance function 
that Madison (and other Framers) viewed as served by the 
force of the sheer existence of a vast commercial republic. In 
the process, the Court evidenced eager willingness to exercise 
power so as to displace judgments not only of Congress and the 
President, but of the states.88 The supposedly pro-federalism 
Court relished displacing state power, especially in the dor- 
 
 
tional controversy to end their national division by accepting a common man-
date rooted in the Constitution.”). The Casey Court explained, “Liberty must 
not be extinguished for want of a line that is clear. And it falls to us to give 
some real substance to the woman’s liberty to determine whether to carry her 
pregnancy to full term.” Id. at 869. 
 85. Cass Sunstein argues that Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), can 
best be understood as “judicial invalidation of a law that had become hope-
lessly out of touch with existing social convictions.” Cass R. Sunstein, What 
Did Lawrence Hold? Of Autonomy, Desuetude, Sexuality, and Marriage, 2003 
SUP. CT. REV. 27, 27 (2004). Diana Hassel agrees that the Court’s decision to 
discard its Bowers precedent may be explained by “the increasing social and 
culture [sic] acceptance and integration of lesbians and gay men since 1986.” 
Diana Hassel, Lawrence v. Texas: Evolution of Constitutional Doctrine, 9 
ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 565, 574 (2004). 
 86. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison). 
 87. In Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996), the Court struck down 
the Colorado statute in question because it imposed a disadvantage “born of 
animosity toward the class of persons affected.” Further, it declared that equal 
protection must at the least mean that a “‘bare . . . desire to harm a politically 
unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate government interest.’” Id. 
(quoting U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)). The Court 
in Lawrence struck down Texas’s antisodomy law in part because it demeaned 
homosexuals. 539 U.S. at 575. 
 88. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 555–79 (2005) and Atkins v. 
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 304–20 (2002) (removing from the states the power to 
execute those under eighteen or the mentally retarded); see also Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 507–16 (2004) and Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 466–
73 (2004) (overruling the President’s claim of authority in unlawful combatant 
cases); Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 431 (holding that Miranda “may not be in effect 
overruled by an Act of Congress”). 
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mant Commerce Clause arena and in substantive due process 
(ranging from abortion to punitive damages).89 
A recent example makes the point—namely the Ten Com-
mandments cases from spring 2005. On June 27, 2005, the 
Court handed down its much discussed, and indeed much lam-
pooned, decisions in Van Orden and McCreary.90 Chief Justice 
Rehnquist quipped, in his last day to grace the Supreme Court 
bench where he had served for over thirty years, that there 
were so many opinions in the two cases that he had not realized 
there were so many members on the Court.91 The judicial ca-
cophony was indeed remarkable. The Texas and Kentucky 
cases not only produced seemingly inconsistent results—Texas 
Capitol grounds memorial upheld,92 Kentucky’s courthouse dis-
plays struck down93—but the outpouring of opinions embodying 
clashing constitutional theories was impressively large.94 
Much merriment, and no small criticism, attended this 
Solomonic judgment, but whether one agrees or disagrees, the 
important part for our understanding is that pragmatism car-
ried the day. Unifying principles—such as the neutrality prin-
ciple embraced by Justices Stevens, Souter and Ginsburg, or 
standardized constitutional tests such as the purpose prong 
 
 89. See, e.g., Granholm v. Heald, 125 S. Ct. 1885, 1891–92 (2005) (reject-
ing state claims of authority to restrict importation of wine from out of state 
wineries based on the 21st Amendment); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. 
Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 408–29 (2003) (imposing constitutional limits on pu-
nitive damages); Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 914–22 (2000) (rejecting 
Nebraska’s claim that it had an interest in preventing infanticide by restrict-
ing the partial birth abortion procedure). 
 90. McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005); Van Orden v. 
Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854 (2005). 
 91. David G. Savage, Former Rehnquist Clerks Recall His Wit, Warmth, 
L.A. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2005, at 13. 
 92. Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2858. 
 93. McCreary, 125 S. Ct. at 2754. 
 94. In Van Orden, Chief Justice Rehnquist announced the judgment of the 
Court and delivered an opinion in which he was joined by Justices Scalia, 
Kennedy, and Thomas. Justices Scalia and Thomas, though, wrote separate 
concurring opinions, while Justice Breyer wrote an opinion concurring in the 
judgment. Justice Stevens authored a dissenting opinion, in which he was 
joined by Justice Ginsburg. Justice O’Connor filed her own dissent, and Jus-
tice Souter wrote a dissenting opinion in which Justices Stevens and Ginsburg 
joined. Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. 2854. In McCreary, Justice Souter delivered the 
opinion of the Court joined by Justices Stevens, O’Connor, Breyer, and Gins-
burg. Justice O’Connor filed a separate concurrence. Justice Scalia authored a 
dissent in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas joined fully, and 
in which Justice Kennedy joined in part. McCreary, 125 S. Ct. 2722. 
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(Test One) of the Lemon v. Kurtzman95 three-part test em-
ployed by Justice Souter for the majority in the Kentucky 
case—gave way to an overall, contextually rich judgment.96 
Guiding the Court’s resolution was a practical, history-sensitive 
awareness that to uproot a settled practice (such as the Texas 
half-century old memorial) would lead to political divisive-
ness.97 
My suggestion is that, upon more probing analysis, the 
Rehnquist Court proved over its life deeply unpredictable in a 
wide array of constitutional arenas, and so much so as to defy 
accurate characterization in the highly politicized ideological 
terms of current discourse. At least for the last decade, and in 
particular since the arrival of Justice Stephen Breyer in 1994, 
the Court’s head-scratching unpredictability in many important 
areas of constitutional law had less to do with shifting (or mod-
erating) philosophies on the part of the Justices98 and more to 
 
 95. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
 96. Members of the Court have used the neutrality principle both as its 
own test, and as part of the three-prong Lemon test. Compare Everson v. Bd. 
of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947), with Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612–15. Standing 
alone, the neutrality principle is “the touchstone” of the Court’s Establishment 
Clause analysis. McCreary, 125 S. Ct. at 2733. The “‘First Amendment man-
dates governmental neutrality between religion and religion, and between re-
ligion and nonreligion.’” McCreary, 125 S. Ct. at 2733 (quoting Epperson v. 
Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968)). Under the Lemon test, the neutrality prin-
ciple is disguised as the “purpose prong”—the first part of a Lemon analysis. 
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612–15. “When the government acts with the ostensible 
and predominant purpose of advancing religion, it violates that central Estab-
lishment Clause value of official religious neutrality, there being no neutrality 
when the government’s ostensible object is to take sides.” McCreary, 125 S. Ct. 
at 2733. 
 97. Like Justice Breyer’s decision in Van Orden, Justice Souter’s decision 
in McCreary is not based on any single interpretive tool. Justice Souter recog-
nizes the value of the neutrality principle, but ultimately concludes that 
“given its generality as a principle, an appeal to neutrality alone cannot possi-
bly lay every issue to rest, or tell us what issues on the margins are substan-
tial enough for constitutional significance.” McCreary, 125 S. Ct. at 2743. In-
stead, Justice Souter relies on the political justification for promoting 
government neutrality in religious matters. “The Framers and the citizens of 
their time intended not only to protect the integrity of individual conscience in 
religious matters, but to guard against the civic divisiveness that follows when 
the Government weighs in on one side of religious debate . . . .” McCreary, 125 
S. Ct. at 2742 (internal citations omitted). 
 98. Indeed, many suggest that differing philosophies are what lead to the 
Court’s divisive, piecemeal decisions. See Linda Greenhouse, Farewell to the 
Old Order in the Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 1995, at E1 (stating that with the 
addition of Justices Breyer and Ginsburg, “there turned out to be virtually no 
center for these two experienced Federal judges to anchor [as they] joined a 
Court that, far from converging toward the center, was driven by competing 
STARR_3FMT 05/17/2006 09:15:32 AM 
1382 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [90:1363 
 
do with its flexible, case-by-case approach to constitutional in-
terpretation.99 
IV.  CHIEF JUSTICE TAFT’S LOFTY GOALS 
What is to be done? This question has been asked on two 
separate occasions—once in 1972100 and again in 1975.101 The 
answer, and one with which I do not entirely agree, was the 
creation of a new appellate structure within the federal court 
system.102 At the urging of Chief Justice Burger, Professor Paul 
Freund of the Harvard Law School studied the Supreme 
Court’s caseload and suggested the creation of a National Ap-
pellate Court.103 This new court would resolve “less important” 
circuit conflicts, and would refer the 400 to 500 most important 
cases to the Supreme Court for review.104 In this way, the Su-
 
visions of the Constitution and the country”). Another scholar suggests that 
Greenhouse was implying that “[t]he chief functions of pragmatist or moderate 
stances by Justices on the Rehnquist Court in the mid-1990s . . . was to serve 
as a brake against efforts by other Justices to institute ‘fundamental, even 
radical change’ in constitutional interpretation.” G. Edward White, Unpacking 
the Idea of the Judicial Center, 83 N.C. L. REV. 1089, 1092–93 (2005); see also 
Keith E. Whittington, Once More unto the Breach: PostBehavioralist Ap-
proaches to Judicial Politics, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 601, 606 (2000) (suggest-
ing that many scholars have drawn the plausible conclusion “that judicial de-
cisions simply reflect the political preferences of a majority of the justices on 
the Court at any given time”). 
 99. See William S. Consovoy, The Rehnquist Court and the End of Consti-
tutional Stare Decisis: Casey, Dickerson and the Consequences of Pragmatic 
Adjudication, 2002 UTAH L. REV. 53, 53–55 (2002) (explaining how the 
Rehnquist Court used stare decisis inconsistently, considering it a “tool useful 
in protecting the Court as a political institution, rather than a jurisprudential 
doctrine designed to protect the Court’s precedent”); Graeme B. Dinwoodie, 
The Trademark Jurisprudence of the Rehnquist Court, 8 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. 
L. REV. 187, 207 (2004) (referencing “the Court’s inconsistent use of textual 
interpretation” in trademark conflicts); Bernard Schwartz, Curiouser and Cu-
riouser: The Supreme Court’s Separation of Powers Wonderland, 65 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 587, 616 (1990) (arguing that the flexibility that the Rehnquist 
Court brought to separation of powers jurisprudence solved a few problems 
left by the Burger Court but also created new ones just as perplexing). 
 100. Federal Judicial Center, Report of the Study Group on the Caseload of 
the Supreme Court, 57 F.R.D. 573 (1972) [hereinafter Freund Report]. 
 101. Federal Judicial Center, Commission on Revision of the Federal Court 
Appellate System, Structure and Internal Procedures: Recommendations for 
Change, 67 F.R.D. 195 (1975). 
 102. Id. at 199–204; see also Thomas E. Baker & Douglas D. McFarland, 
The Need for a New National Court, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1400, 1401, 1410–14 
(1987) (arguing that alternatives to a proposed intercircuit panel would be in-
adequate). 
 103. O’Brien, supra note 14, at 789–90. 
 104. Freund Report, supra note 100, at 590–95. 
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preme Court would be the final word on the most important is-
sues of law, thus maintaining uniformity of federal law, with-
out trying to handle the full brunt of its unwieldy docket.105 My 
suggestion, however, is simpler—the Court should decide more 
cases, and it should avoid governing the polity by forcing a cul-
tural agenda. 
To be sure, the Rehnquist Court did not win any gold med-
als for jurisprudential clarity in constitutional interpretation. 
What the Rehnquist Court did well was to resolve classic legal 
issues as contemplated by Chief Justice Taft in the bygone 
days. Consider statutory interpretation cases. The Court, in its 
lawyer-like way, has managed to bring considerably greater 
clarity to the interpretive process with its strong emphasis on 
textual and structural analysis.106 On these issues, the internal 
squabbles tend to be over relatively modest issues such as the 
appropriate use of legislative history.107 But is all this below 
the Court’s dignity? Scarcely. My suggestion is that the Court 
seek to insert itself less in the “Culture Wars,” as reflected by 
its provocative approach in Lawrence v. Texas,108 and tend in-
stead to the second great Taftian charge. Let me illustrate with 
a case from last Term. 
On April 19, 2005, Justice Breyer delivered the Court’s 
unanimous opinion in Dura Pharmaceuticals v. Broudo.109 The 
Broudo Court analyzed the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of 
“loss causation”—the statutory rule that a “private plaintiff 
who claims securities fraud must prove that the defendant’s 
 
 105. Id. 
 106. John F. Manning, The Eleventh Amendment and the Reading of Pre-
cise Constitutional Texts, 113 YALE L.J. 1663, 1669–70 (2004) (“In matters of 
statutory interpretation, a defining trait of the Rehnquist Court has been its 
assiduous observance of the lines drawn by a clear and precise statutory text, 
even when the outcomes seem difficult to square with the statute’s apparent 
background purpose.”). But see Maxine D. Goodman, Reconstructing the Plain 
Language Rule of Statutory Construction: How and Why, 65 MONT. L. REV. 
229, 236–37 (2004) (arguing that “the plain language rule [textualism], as 
used by the Rehnquist Court, fails to provide predictability in statutory 
construction cases”). 
 107. In support of the argument that legislative history has no part in 
statutory interpretation, see ANTONIN SCALIA, Common-Law Courts in a 
Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the 
Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS 
AND THE LAW 3, 31–32 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997). See generally John F. Man-
ning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673 (1997) 
(analyzing the textualist judges’ objections to legislative history). 
 108. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 109. 125 S. Ct. 1627 (2005). 
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fraud caused an economic loss.”110 Reversing the Ninth Cir-
cuit,111 the Supreme Court put an end to uncertainty that had 
been lingering for almost fifteen years—since 1990, the Second, 
Third, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits had all weighed 
in on the issue.112 The Court’s methodology in the case was sim-
ple. First, the Court examined the logical underpinnings of the 
Ninth Circuit’s decision.113 Citing the same statute that the 
Ninth Circuit was interpreting, the Broudo Court found the 
“pure logic” behind the Ninth Circuit’s analysis “insufficient.”114 
Second, the Court steeped itself in precedent and the common 
law.115 The Court turned to its own decisions, the decisions of 
lower state and federal courts, and restatements of the common 
law before ultimately rejecting the “uniqueness of [the Ninth 
Circuit’s] perspective.”116 Finally, the Broudo Court delved into 
the relevant statutory language.117 The Court determined that 
the statute clearly expressed the intent of Congress, and that 
the Ninth Circuit’s approach was “inconsistent” with the statu-
tory requirements of loss causation.118 Without appealing to 
their “own independent judgment,” the Justices dismantled the 
Ninth Circuit’s analysis. The Court, in short, deserves high 
marks for bringing about much-needed clarity, siding in the 
process with the vast majority of circuits.119 
In Broudo, the Supreme Court lived up to its Taftian du-
ties: it promoted uniformity within federal securities law, and it 
resolved an existing circuit conflict. But why the long wait? 
 
 110. Id. at 1629 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4) (2000)). 
 111. Broudo v. Dura Pharms. Inc., 339 F.3d 933 (9th Cir. 2003). The Ninth 
Circuit held that a claim for “loss causation” can be supported “simply by al-
leging in the complaint and subsequently establishing that ‘the price’ of the 
security ‘on the date of purchase was inflated because of the misrepresenta-
tion.’” Broudo, 125 S. Ct. at 1629 (quoting Broudo, 339 F.3d at 938). 
 112. Broudo, 125 S. Ct. at 1630 (citing Emergent Capital Inv. Mgmt., LLC 
v. Stonepath Group, Inc., 343 F.3d 189 (2d Cir. 2003)) (noting that the Ninth 
Circuit’s views differ from other circuits); Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., 223 
F.3d 165 (3d Cir. 2000); Robbins v. Koger Props., Inc., 116 F.3d 1441 (11th Cir. 
1997); Bastian v. Petren Res. Corp., 892 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1990). 
 113. Broudo, 125 S. Ct. at 1631–32 (examining the “pure logic” behind the 
Ninth Circuit’s decision). 
 114. Id. at 1632 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4) (2000)). 
 115. Id. at 1632–33 (noting that the “Ninth Circuit’s holding lacks support 
in precedent”). 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 1633–34. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 1630 (noting that the Ninth Circuit’s analysis differed from the 
circuits that had already examined the issue). 
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Why did the marketplace—and the securities bar—have to wait 
year after year to secure an authoritative answer to a recurring 
issue in federal law? Chief Justice Taft, splendid lawyer that he 
was, might well have joined the thoroughly sensible, unani-
mous opinion for the Court. But he might have, at the same 
time, inquired of his modern-day colleagues, “What took you so 
long to get around to maintaining uniformity in this important 
body of federal law?” My argument is not merely that the Su-
preme Court got it right in Broudo, but also that the Broudo 
Court got it right for the right reasons. Instead of engaging in 
the dogmatic inquiries exemplified by the Van Orden and 
McCreary decisions, the Justices in Broudo properly based 
their decision on precedent and the actual language of the stat-
ute in question. The Roberts Court would do well to take more 
cases like Broudo. Filling its merits docket with Broudo-like 
cases may not increase the Supreme Court’s caseload, but it 
would allow the Justices to resolve important questions of fed-
eral law and maintain uniformity of the law without having to 
resort to “Olympian” measures. In so doing, the Court would 
live up to Chief Justice Taft’s vision by applying the law rather 
than making cultural statements. At the same time, the Court 
would avoid the politicized pitfalls that have accompanied some 
of the Rehnquist Court’s more recent decisions. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court’s docket is a scarce, indeed precious national re-
source. Perhaps part of the answer to the shrinking docket is 
for the Court, once again, to put its shoulder to the wheel and 
work harder. In any event, thoughtful consideration should be 
given to the manifest problem of nonuniformity in the ever-
growing body of federal law. And perhaps Taftian-style training 
would be helpful for incoming law clerks as to the manifest im-
portance of clarity in federal law. 
